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This paper aims to identify both the level and the reasons of the decreasing loyalty in the transactions 
between tobacco growers and tobacco processors in Brazil. The theoretical approach relies on 
Transaction Cost Economics. Semi-structured interviews were held with growers and companies’ 
directors, and a structured questionnaire was used to obtain data from a sample of 381 tobacco 
growers in Brazil. Indicators of loyalty were created and analyzed. Based on the Euclidean distance, an 
original method to measure the level of loyalty is provided. It was found that 55% of growers were yet 
loyal. The number of non-loyal growers was increasing due to increasing competition among 
processors. Processors´ procurement strategies disturbed the traditional hybrid governance structure, 
which was based on loyalty, introducing uncertainty, higher costs and unknown consequences to 
competitiveness. The article brings empirical evidence on how sector competitiveness can be 
threatened by competition for suppliers. There are lessons for business managers and for anti-trust 
authorities.  
 





The tobacco market has been conditioned by an 
unfavorable institutional environment and constraints of 
various kinds, such as government restrictions on 
production, sales and advertising, as well as declining 
social acceptance of smoking and smuggling (WHO, 
2008). The market has undergone structural changes 
associated with an unfavorable institutional context and 
changing habits of customers. The demand for higher 
quality tobacco increased, thus requiring tighter control of 
suppliers and production processes. 
The Brazilian tobacco industry has undeniably 
achieved  a  leading  position  in  the  new  context  of  
the world market. While the other two main production 
regions of high-grade tobacco, which are within the 
U.S.A. and Zimbabwe, face difficulties to sustain their 
level of production, the Brazilian industry was able to run 
a highly competitive production chain. In the U.S.A., 
restrictions on production and reduction of government 
support determined the end of its dominance in the 
production of high-grade tobacco. In Zimbabwe, the civil 
war and land reform led to a severe breakdown in 
tobacco growing. In opposition, production has increased 
in Brazil, which has become the largest exporter since 
1993,  when  it  overtook  the  U.S.A.  In  2010,   Brazilian
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exports were 505 thousand metric tons, a 22% share of 
total world exports (AFUBRA, 2011).  
The coordination of small farmers, as suppliers of 
tobacco leaf, adopted in Brazil by most tobacco 
processors is pointed out as a platform from 
which it was possible to build up Brazilian leadership 
in the international market for high-grade tobacco. The 
structure of governance adopted comprises a number of 
agents and organizations with different profiles, sizes, 
specialties and functions. The central roles are played by 
tobacco leaf processing companies, which coordinate 
their own network of suppliers (mostly small family 
farmers) by setting volumes and production 
specifications, buying predetermined amounts of tobacco 
leaves at predetermined minimum prices, and carrying 
out exports. There are also organizations representing 
the interests of growers and processing companies, 
regulatory bodies and technical and/or political discussion 
forums. 
Transactions between growers and processing 
companies are ruled by contract farming that sets up 
overall production and trade conditions. Traditionally, 
these contracts were based on ad hoc no written loyalty, 
which is said to be essential for companies’ control of 
their production flows and quality, and to reduce the cost 
of selection and monitoring suppliers. Also, it enables the 
companies the appropriation of a quasi-rent and getting 
return of investment on assets dedicated to the 
transactions. Loss of loyalty would certainly have an 
impact on both costs and effectiveness of this 
governance in the medium term. From the standpoint of 
processing companies, control of production process 
would weaken and risk would increase. Therefore, 
decreasing loyalty jeopardizes management of both 
supply planning and costs. If growers undertake more 
than one contract with more than one company or sells to 
third parties in the spot market, returns on investment 
may not be appropriated exclusively. If worse comes to 
worst, the governance structure would be no longer 
appropriate to sustain competitiveness because 
processing companies would no longer be able to get 
return on investment.  
In midst of the years 2000, the major tobacco 
processing companies in Brazil identified decreasing 
loyalty of their suppliers. The number of growers 
undertaking contracts with two or more companies, 
contract default and the number growers selling off-
contracted tobacco in the spot market was increasing. 
Some companies and Brazilian tobacco organizations 
were concerned about this fact. Overall, Brazilian 
competitiveness was threatened. A research project was 
then designed in order to better understand the tobacco 
market in Brazil and find out the causes of the problem, 
as well as measure the decrease of loyalty. This paper 
presents the results of this research project, with special 
focus on both the level and the reasons of the decreasing 







Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) gave support to the 
analysis presented in this article. In opposition to the 
neoclassical microeconomic theory, TCE assumes that 
markets cannot works by the price mechanism alone. 
Organizations are also necessary, and so TCE aims to 
identify the best way of organizing economic 
transactions. TCE attempts to explain the organizational 
forms of markets and the contractual arrangements 
established in transactions. Agents should seek 
governance structures that enable the reduction of 
transaction costs (North, 1994). Williamson (1985) 
proposes three basic forms of governance: classical 
market (spot), hybrid forms and vertical integration or 
hierarchy. Williamson's emphasis on the analysis of 
governance structures brought out hybrid structures that 
were between the market and hierarchy.  
Ménard (2004) highlights the importance of building a 
theory that explains the structures that lie between 
market and hierarchy, even if the agents engaged in 
these transactions are totally independent, but work 
together in some kind of business. There are a variety of 
arrangements, in which the price mechanisms of market 
clearing are less important than sharing technologies, 
capital, products or services; although full integration of 
the agents is not adopted. In hybrid structures, the 
coordination of activities would be based on cooperation 
of independent agents and sharing of important 
decisions, such as investment to be made. On the one 
hand, cooperation creates a culture of joint search for 
higher performance and profitability for all. On the other 
hand, a poor distribution of efforts and profits can easily 
generate conflicts that destabilize the arrangement.  
To reduce the problem of opportunism, three factors 
must be observed (Ménard, 2004). First, agents must be 
carefully chosen on the basis of screening and 
reputation. Second, the choice of the governance should 
consider the necessary balance between independence 
of agents and the need to take common actions. In this 
sense, the governance structure of the transactions must 
include neither rigid firm´s hierarchical controls nor fragile 
spot market controls. Third, an information system is 
highly recommended to underpin the hybrid form of 
coordination and reduce information asymmetry. 
Another issue found in the literature on hybrid forms is 
the importance of competitive pressure in the modeling of 
the governance structure. This pressure operates on two 
levels. For instance, on one level, suppliers can compete 
with each other for the same buyer. On another level, a 
firm and its suppliers compete with other firms and their 
own suppliers. In this case, suppliers could be either loyal 
or non-loyal. 
In agrifood chains, processors competing within the 
same product market sign formal contracts with farmers 
in which loyalty is demanded. Where asset specificity is 
low or moderate, and  the  market  is  highly  competitive,




Table 1. Sale composition of two hypothetic growers, % of season production quantity. 
 
Sale composition Sale (%) Grower A (%) Grower B (%) 
Processor 1 s1 100 40 
Processor 2 s2 0 50 
Spot 1 s3 0 5 
Spot 2 s4 0 5 




farmers are able to migrate from one processor to 
another in order to increase profit. Thereby, this move 
increases the instability of the structure. In highly 
competitive markets, where uncertainty is a constant, 
hybrid forms of coordination are adopted as a way to 
facilitate union of efforts and flexibility in order to reduce 
instability.  
In fact, several studies have used TCE with the aim of 
identifying the simultaneous adoption of different 
governance structures in the same market. Although, 
Williamson (1985) had not addressed this possibility, 
Bradach and Eccles (1989) identified it in the real world. 
The authors have termed this as plural forms, in which 
“[…] distinct organizational control mechanisms operate 
simultaneously for the same function by the same firm.” 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989: 112). The explanations for 
the existence of plural forms have been classified   into 
three groups: (a) different features of the transactions; (b) 
plural forms as a transitional situation and (c) stable 
plural forms as a strategy to coordinate the transactions 
over time. The second one is especially relevant for this 
study as it brings additional discussion on the stability of 
governance structures. Authors of the second group 
consider the use of more than one form of governance as 
transitional, where one or another governance structure 
should prevail given that adjustments occur. Zylbersztajn 
and Nogueira (2002) assumed that one of the forms of 
governance, the most efficient one, would  gradually be  
adopted by the agents. Alternative types of governance 
could coexist as points of disequilibrium in an adjustment 
process. Plurality of arrangements could be explained by: 
(a) situations of disequilibrium, in which the presence of 
plural forms could represent a situation of adjustment 
between the current and future forms, driven by 
modifications in the features of the transactions; (b) 
barriers to the adoption of a new improved governance 
due to the existence of specific non-transferrable 
routines; (c) effects of the institutional environment in 
which governance occurs as an event generating multiple 
alignments. However, establishing and operating 
mechanisms such as economic incentives, regulation and 
contracts in order to reduce conflicts, contradictions and 
transaction costs is a big challenge, particularly when 
agents have to adopt plural and hybrid governances to 
respond to market complexities and different types of 
requirements posed by their clients and institutional rules. 
This is the case of the tobacco industry, as will be shown 





The study was conducted in 2005, in the Rio Pardo Valley, State of 
Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Semi-structured interviews with a non-
statistical sample of 40 growers (landowners, sharecroppers and 
tenants) were conducted in a first stage. In a second stage, 
structured questionnaires were applied to a statistically 
representative sample of 381 tobacco growers. Semi-structured 
questionnaires were also designed for interviews with managers of 
processing companies. However, researchers faced enormous 
difficulties in obtaining information on/from this source. Few of the 
managers were willing to talk, and only three responded to an open 
format questionnaire. Companies reacted negatively because of 
distrust and competition among them. The approach adopted to 
circumvent this problem involved procuring information from 
AFUBRA (Brazilian Association of Tobacco Growers), 
SINDITABACO (Tobacco Processing Industry Association) and 
from growers themselves. Managers of both associations agreed to 
answer open format questions.  
In order to measure loyalty, the sampled growers provided 
information on their selling strategies before sowing and during the 
harvest. Before sowing, growers usually sign one or more contracts 
with processors. During the harvest, when the tobacco production is 
ready for delivery, they have following options: (a) complying with 
contracts signed before sowing, (b) sell all or part of its production 
in a spot transaction (without contract) to one or more processors, 
(c) sell all or part of its production in a spot transaction (without 
contract) to middlemen. The grower can establish his final selling 
strategy by combining the options above. For example, a grower 
could compromise 100% of his production to a single processor by 
signing a contract before sowing. When production comes in the 
harvest period, he complies with his contract and do not sell 
tobacco to other buyers. This grower is a loyal supplier, ideal in the 
established governance structure. Table 1 illustrates the sale 
composition of two hypothetical growers. Grower A signed a 
farming contract with a processor before sowing, selling 100% of 
his production to this processor. Grower B signed two contracts with 
two processors, but also sells tobacco in the spot market to one 
middleman and a third processor. His sales are allocated as follow: 
40% for the first processor, 50% for the second processor, 5% for 
the middleman and 5% for a third processor without contract. 
Grower A is a loyal supplier while Grower B is not. 
The increasing number of type B growers threatened the 
established governance structure. It meant a loss in control of 
suppliers, which could have negative consequences, not only in 
terms of product quality as well as increasing cost. However, from 
the standpoint of growers this was a positive move, as they had 
more options than before.  
The system would not be threatened if growers with more than 
one contract fulfilled all obligations by selling exactly what was




Table 2. Initial estimated distribution of selling and final selling of a hypothetic grower, % of 
grower´s total estimated production and % of grower´s actual selling. 
 
Selling composition 
Estimated  Actual 
1 2 (%)  3 4 (%) 
Processor 1 e1 60  s1 40 
Processor 2 e2 40  s2 50 
Spot 1 e3 0  s3 10 
Spot 2 e4 0  s4 0 




promised to each processor. In fact, one of the main threatening is 
growers´ decision to sell their production under contract farming 
with a processor to another buyer. In this case, loyalty would not be 
a problem, but default would be. Default can be either total or 
partial, as any percentage of contracted production can be 
reallocated to a third party. This kind of production reallocation 
should be measured in order to provide a better understanding of 
the impact of loss of loyalty.  
In order to estimate this reallocation, we obtained valid 
information on the amount of production that each sampled grower 
contracted with processors. This estimation is made by processors´ 
advisors when they visit the growers’ crops. This procedure is taken 
before signing the contract. The estimated amounts are then written 
in the contracts. Information on the final selling strategy adopted by 
each grower was also obtained in order to be compared with the 
estimations written in the contracts. Reallocation would be 
determined by the difference between estimation written in the 
contracts and the production that was actually delivered to each 
processor or spot market buyers. For example, suppose a grower 
has two different contracts, each with a different processor. A 
contract is signed with processor 1, in which the grower is 
committed to sell an estimated production of 4.500 kilos. Another 
contract is signed with processor 2, in which the grower is 
committed to sell an estimated production of 3.000 kilos. Therefore, 
the grower would have an estimated production of 7.500 kilos. 
Assuming that both estimations do not fail due to weather and 
growers do not reallocate, one would expect that the grower will sell 
exactly 4.500 kilos to processor 1 and 3.000 kilos to processor 2, 
fulfilling contract obligations. However, suppose that during the 
harvest period, the second processor offers additional incentives to 
grower, who decides to increase his sales to this processor, say, to 
6.000 kilos, and, as a consequence, decrease his sales to the first 
processor, say to 1.500 kilos. In this case, there would be a large 
reallocation from the first to the second processor. 
The example above can be modified to include two possible 
additional grower´s transactions during the harvest period: one with 
a third processor and another with a middleman, both of them being 
spot market transactions. Table 2 illustrates a possible combination 
of final transactions considering these two new options. The grower 
committed 60% of his production to Processor 1 and 40% to 
Processor 2, both of them with contract. However, the composition 
of his final transactions shows that 40% of production was sold to 
Processor 1, 50% to Processor 2 and 10% to a Middleman. 
An indicator for this kind of reallocations was then created, taking 
the information as provided in the example of Table 2. Columns 2 
and 4 of Table 2 can be considered as two vectors, each of which 
establishes a point in a four-dimensional space. For example, 
Column 2 vector in is (60, 40, 0, 0), and the Column 4 vector is (40, 
50, 10, 0). Therefore, two points in a four-dimensional space are 
observed. If reallocations are not observed, one would expect that 
these two points are in the same position. In other words, Column 4 
would be the same as Column 2. In  this  case,  they  coincide  in  a 
four-dimensional space, so the distance between them would be 
zero. Therefore, we can consider the distance between two points 
as a measure of the reallocation. 















Where D is the distance between the points x and y; and xi and yi 
are the respective coordinates. The calculated Euclidean distance 
of the points of Table 2 is 26.5. Suppose a grower who committed 
with 100% of his production to a single processor, but has sold 
100% to another. This is a case of total default. The Euclidean 
distance of these two points would be 141.4. 
Data on the composition of growers´ estimated sales established 
in contracts and on the composition of the actual sales of 289 
growers allow for calculating the Euclidean distance. In the case of 
88 growers, this calculation could not be performed due to missing 
data. The Euclidean distance was then normalized in order to 
obtain an indicator ranging from 0 to 100. 
 
 
INCREASING MARKET COMPETITION AND 
DECREASING FARMER LOYALTY  
 
Tobacco production in the South of Brazil is not recent. 
An embryonic form of the current hybrid structure of 
governance was established in the early decades of the 
20th century and consolidated in the 1970s. A tobacco 
cluster in the South of Brazil was developed during this 
period, alongside a regulatory framework (Mesquita and 
Oliveira, 2003). The social capital of growers and the 
experience and knowledge of the local population in 
connection with tobacco growing have been handing 
down from generation to generation. These factors are 
also among the main assets responsible for the 
competitiveness of Brazilian tobacco and its significant 
share of the international market. 
Family farms dominate the scenario. Around 180 
thousand families were growing tobacco in three states of 
the South of Brazil in 2010 (AFUBRA, 2009). The field 
survey found an average of 3.7 people per household. 
Each household had 2.9 people on average working 
mostly in tobacco growing. Hired labor accounted for only 





family production. The average size of the farms was 11 
ha, with tobacco occupying 4 ha on average. Besides 
tobacco, the main cash crop, most farms have areas 
dedicated to staple food.  
Processing companies act as a link between growers 
and cigarette manufacturers, with whom they have 
contractual relationships calling for continuous supply, 
reputation building and implicit partnerships to comply 
with standards and meet requirements of the market. 
Processing companies enter into commitments with 
cigarette manufactures well before the tobacco crop 
season starts, so they must plan in advance for tobacco 
leaf supplies to fulfil these commitments.  
The market for tobacco leaves in Brazil is dominated by 
three large processing corporations, Universal Leaf 
Tobacco, Souza Cruz (controlled by British American 
Tobacco) and Alliance One. In 2003, they had 75% of 
Brazil’s installed capacity to grade, process and market 
tobacco leaves (SEAE, 2005). Around 20 small and 
medium firms also participate in this market. Despite this 
concentration, there were no signs of the accommodation 
in the tobacco leaf market. In fact, fierce rivalry was found 
among competing tobacco processors due to relatively 
low entry barriers (SEAE, 2005).  
Each major processing company established its own 
supply chain of tobacco leaves. They aim for centralized 
control of all key variables that affect supply, so as to 
reduce uncertainty regarding raw material quantity, 
quality and cost. This coordination involves an array of 
economic and legal mechanisms that contractually define 
the relations between the processor and each grower. 
Although the sale and purchase contract is the main legal 
mechanism of coordination, relations between companies 
and growers transcend contracts and extend to a 
universe of values relating to tradition and the local 
culture. Coordination of each processor’s suppliers is 
responsibility of his/her own team of agricultural advisers 
who monitor and transmit information in both directions 
between the processor and the growers. Each processor 
also has its own links to banks, agricultural input 
suppliers, transporters and service providers in general to 
provide grower’s needs. 
This governance is justified by the needs and aims of 
both tobacco processors and growers. From the 
processors’ standpoint, beyond planning in advance for 
huge volumes of tobacco leaves, a set of strict 
specifications in terms of both quantity and quality has to 
be met. Extrinsic and intrinsic tobacco properties are 
demanded by cigarettes manufactures related to quality 
and lack of contaminants as well as social responsibility 
standards such as a ban on child labor and 
environmental protection. Processing companies are 
obliged to devote a large proportion of their resources to 
compliance of increasing restrictions, oversight and 
penalties both in Brazil and abroad.  
From the growers’ standpoint, the rationale for the 
governance also involves several factors. Tobacco is the  




main source of earnings and usually the only one for 
these small, sometimes very small, farmers. Tobacco 
growing incurs high costs per unit area, with unstable 
yields. Its quality is highly sensitive to variation under 
weather conditions, with direct effects on income. It is 
also labor-intensive and this makes it hard to combine 
with other cash crops. Unlike in other countries, the 
Brazilian government offers no policy or market 
mechanisms to properly mitigate the risks associated with 
tobacco farming and marketing, so farmers are totally 
exposed to high risks associated to weather conditions 
and market. It is unlikely that tobacco growing could be 
carried on by small farmers without guaranteed purchase 
volumes and prices, as well as facilitated access to inputs 
and credit provided by tobacco processors. This hybrid 
structure of governance addresses all these difficulties 
and enables family farmers to engage successfully in 
tobacco production even under such challenging 
conditions.  
In the sale and purchase contract, growers and 
processing companies formalize their reciprocal 
commitments before the start of the crop year. In order to 
assure the flow of tobacco supplies, processors 
undertake to provide transportation services, 
procurement of inputs, technological information and 
support in obtaining credit for growers. Growers have 
also to guarantee the purchase of the crop for a price 
that, in some of the years, is set by an agreement 
between growers’ and processors’ organizations. In 
addition, growers who sign contracts have access to the 
hail insurance policy managed by their association 
AFUBRA. Processors subtract the insurance premium 
from growers´ revenue when they are paid for their 
tobacco leaves. Thus, the contract reduces growers’ 
economic risk and enables participation by family farmers 
who otherwise would find it difficult to engage in the 
activity. 
Implementing and managing this hybrid governance 
incurs high operational and transaction costs that are 
hard to measure. Data from interviews with managers of 
processing companies enable us to obtain a not very 
accurate measurement of the cost of installing such a 
system for a new entrant. According to the interviews, the 
cost of maintaining the operating structures can be as 
much as 10 to 12% of a processing company’s revenue. 
This includes the cost of hiring advisers, transportation, 
clerical staff to perform all the office work relating to 
contracts, and ex-post transaction costs in the event of 
debt renegotiation or default. 
In the middle of the years 2000, processors perceived a 
decreasing loyalty of their tobacco leaves suppliers. 
Behind this decreasing loyalty, processors were fiercely 
competing to poach growers from rivals. In the past, there 
was an unwritten rule that each processor had its own 
suppliers and strove to build up loyalty among them: this 
amounted to what is known as an “institutional or 
corporate culture”. However, loyalty  was  undermined  by 




the proliferation of growers with more than one formal 
contract and sales in the spot market. The increasing 
number of transactions in the spot market between 
growers, middlemen and processors indicated that the 
market was more complex and competitive than might 
have appeared from a description of a well-coordinated 
structure of governance. It should be recognized that the 
rising number of growers with more than one contract 
and the increasing market-share of the middlemen at the 
service of other companies have opened up the old 
model of coordination, giving growers more leeway in 
marketing their tobacco than they used to have in the 
past.  
From the growers’ standpoint, having contracts with 
more than one company is fully justified as a strategy to 
add another source of income while creating options for 
selling, and increasing their bargaining power versus the 
processors. Thus, from the market standpoint, this 
opening-up is positive.  
The fact that growers can sell to more than one buyer 
confirms the intense competition among processors. In 
fact, competition among companies has been one of the 
main determinants of the changes pointed out above. 
The main reason for an increasing competition can be 
found in the international market. The Zimbabwe debacle 
and falling production in the United States have driven up 
international demand for Brazilian tobacco. As a result, 
new companies have established themselves in Brazil, 
traditional companies have rapidly expanded production 
capacity, the activities of spot dealers have increased, 
and major international buyers have set up offices to buy 
tobacco in the country. These sudden changes in market 
structure, with expanding production and the entry of new 
players, translates into an intensification of competition 
among companies for growers and tobacco leaf 
production.  
Competition for tobacco leaves has led to a tug-of-war 
between players, both new and old. Processors adopted 
aggressive strategies to recruit new growers and 
defensive strategies to avoid loss of loyalty. In this 
environment, the ability of traditional processors to 
coordinate and manage their supplies of tobacco leaves 
has weakened considerably. Meanwhile, the cost-benefit 
of the hybrid governance has dropped, making traditional 
processing companies more vulnerable to competition 
from outsiders that operate at lower cost precisely 
because they buy high quality tobacco leaves reallocated 
from contracts to the spot market. For new entrants 
and/or smaller firms with less capital, the strategy of 
buying tobacco leaves from growers already integrated 
with and trained by other companies was highly 
advantageous. They could buy first-class tobacco without 
having to spend large amounts of capital into the 
formation and maintenance of a hybrid structure of 
governance. And since they do not incur in high 
coordination costs, they can offer higher prices to 






In a context of intense competition, the major players 
adopt contradictory strategies. In order to expand their 
base of growers they try to attract growers from 
competitors. The first step is to offer to growers the 
second, sometimes the third, formal contract. The victim 
processor reacts by offering the same to the growers of 
his rivals´ base. Also, large processors buy tobacco from 
the smaller ones and the middlemen. In this non-
cooperative game, in an environment of increasing 
demand for high quality tobacco, minor players are used 
as intermediaries between large processors and the 
growers. This kind of game mutually disrupts the 
traditional governance.  
Processors adopted defensive strategies in an attempt 
to strengthen the loyalty of already contracted growers. 
These strategies were based on promises of financial 
and non-financial advantages. The most widespread 
practice has been to offer additional payments in 
advance. Although this strategy tries to build loyalty and 
trust, it increased growers´ indebtedness and repayment 
default. This was exactly the situation that has led many 
growers to sell tobacco to competitors, thereby avoiding 
the repayment deductions. According to perceptions of 
companies´ managers, repayment default reached 
almost 20% of growers in 2005, an astonishing increase 
if compared to the historical pattern of less than 5%.   
Because of loss of loyalty, rising competition and 
default, transaction cost was increasing. In order to 
compensate for this, major processors adopted measures 
to reduce costs, such as increasing the number of 
growers per adviser. In this case, advisers become much 
more like credit agents, input sellers and purchase 
representatives than an agent for technology diffusion 
and production control. This too was a contradictory 
strategy, which disturbs the structure of governance. 
According to interviews with managers, a large number 
of growers with more than one contract failed to repay 
financial commitments. Besides the financial default, 
difficult to recover, one must also consider that other 
costs, such as those related to monitoring and supply 
disruptions, are not recovered. Supply disruptions 
undermine processors´ ability to fulfil contracts with 
cigarettes companies triggering a search for 
compensation by means of strategies that undermines 
the governance itself.  
 
 
MEASURING LOSS OF LOYALTY 
 
The number of contracts each grower had undertaken 
with different processing companies and the number of 
off-contract sales in the spot market, in 2005, were used 
to create proxy variables for loyalty. A grower can be 
considered loyal if he or she attained two conditions: (1) 
had one contract with a single processing company and 
(2) did not sell tobacco in the spot market. Loss of  loyalty




Table 3. Loyal growers, number and percentage of growers by processor. 
 
Processors Number of loyal growers % of loyal growers 
Universal 41 43 
Souza Cruz 21 46 
Alliance One 86 60 
CTA 32 54 




occurs in cases in which either a grower sign more than 
one contract with more than one processing company or 
sell off-contract tobacco in the spot market.  
Taking the definition above, data from the sample 
showed that 55% of growers were loyal suppliers (Table 
3). During the 2005 crop season, each of these growers 
signed one contract with one processor. They did not sell 
to any other, either a processor or a middleman. 
Segregating data for the major processors, figures are: 
Universal, 43%, Souza Cruz, 46%, CTA, 54% and 
Alliance One, 60%. Considering these data, Alliance One 
and CTA were the most successful processors in setting 
up a group of suppliers that would fit in the ideal model of 
loyalty. However, both were still far from having 100% of 
loyal suppliers. 
Non-loyal growers, 45% of the samples, establish their 
own combination of transactions with large and small 
processors, as well as middlemen. As a rule, middlemen 
are supplied by growers who have a contract with a 
processor. They had been traditionally functional to the 
system as they used to buy small amount of tobacco 
leaves, which was often either production that exceeded 
the quantity under contract or rejected by the processor. 
In this sense, transactions with middlemen are functional 
for processors in the traditional governance, as 
middlemen liberate a processor from the obligation to buy 
when they do not want to. For instance, a processor may 
not be interested in the tobacco leaves of one particular 
contracted grower because of unexpected low quality of 
his production.  Then, this processor liberates the 
growers to sell to middlemen, who resell to other 
processors in need of these tobacco leaves. Thus, 
middlemen give flexibility to the traditional structure of 
governance.  
Most of middlemen are self-employed, buying in small 
quantities, adding brokering service value, which 
basically consists in collecting small quantities 
of tobacco leaves from small farms and shipping them 
to the wholesale centers or processors. In the case of 
middlemen, it is common to operate in the 
market for and on behalf of a processor that also 
maintains its own network of growers with contracts. 
Data from sampled growers and interviews with 
processors´ managers showed that processors were 
increasing their transactions with middlemen beyond of 
what would be expected in  terms  of  the  functionality  of 
middlemen in the traditional governance. The main 
explanation for this fact was the new procurement 
strategies adopted by processors when market rivalry 
increases.   
The large number of non-loyal growers revealed a new 
picture. The most frequent selling strategies adopted by 
these growers were of two types: two contracts with two 
large processors; and a contract with a large processor 
combined to another contract with a small processor. 
Less frequent selling strategies were also found, such as 
a grower selling to two processors, with contracts, as well 
as selling to either a third processor or a middleman in a 
spot market transaction.  
Table 4 shows the number and frequency of loyal and 
non-loyal sampled growers, according to the four major 
processors, Universal, Souza Cruz, Alliance One and 
CTA, in the columns. In this table, growers with one 
contract, and additionally selling to middlemen, were 
considered loyal, assuming that this combination is 
functional, as stated before. Non-loyal growers are those 
who: hold more than one contract with processors, hold 
more than one contract and sell part of his production in 
spot transactions with other processors, and hold one 
contract and sell part of his production in spot 
transactions with other processors. The data in the table 
also show the number non-loyal growers’ second 
contracts, stating the name of respective second buyers. 
For example, it was observed that 74% of the suppliers of 
Universal are loyal and the remaining 26% are non-loyal. 
These non-loyal growers held two formal contracts, one 
with Universal and another with the processors identified 
in the lines of Table 4. For the set of Universal's suppliers 
in the sample, 9% held also one contract with one of the 
three other major processors (Souza Cruz, Alliance One 
and CTA), while 17% held the second contract with 
smaller processors. This pattern, with minor variations, is 
repeated for Souza Cruz and Alliance One. In the case of 
CTA, it was observed that 20% of its suppliers held a 
second contract with one of the other three major 
processors, while 9% held contracts with smaller 
suppliers.  
These figures indicate the existence of competition for 
suppliers among processors. In the past, the unwritten 
rule in the market was that each processor had its own 
suppliers, with whom they had ties and loyalty, and 
instilled the "culture  of  the  company."  Even  taking  into




Table 4. Loyal and non-loyal growers of the major four processors, combinations of non-loyal growers, Universal, Souza Cruz, 
Alliance One e CTA, 381 sampled growers. 
 
Loyal and non-loyal growers 
Universal Souza Cruz Alliance one CTA 
N % N % N % N % 
Loyal growers 71 74 35 76 120 84 42 71 
Non-loyal growers 25 26 11 24 23 16 17 29 
Alliance One 4 4     5 8 
ATC 2 2 1 2 5 3   
Botucarai     2 1   
Brasfumo 4 4   1 1   
Brazil Tobaccos     1 1   
CTA 4 4 3 7 5 3   
Industrial Boettcher     1 1   
INTAB 1 1 1 2 1 1   
Kannenberg 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 
L. Beth 2 2       
Marasca 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 
Premium 3 3     1 2 
Souza Cruz 1 1     3 5 
Unifumos     1 1   
Universal   1 2 4 3 4 7 
Vale Sul 1 1 3 7   1 2 




account that the technical requirements and quality 
demanded by processors are quite similar, the advent, 
and increasing number, of non-loyal growers implied 
some loss of control over the supply chain, as far as 
reallocations of production among processors are 
facilitated. Consequently, uncertainty on the planned 
amount of tobacco leaf supply increases. From the point 
of view of growers, the strategy of having more than one 
contract is fully justified, as competition makes 
room for better prices. However, in the view of 
companies’ staff members, double contracts would have 
a deleterious impact on the system by raising 
transaction costs and reducing its effectiveness formal 
contracts. 
It should be stressed that 9% of production quantity 
was sold without contracts, with 6.5% going to spot 
market middlemen and 2.5% to processors. These 
percentages may seem small, but they are significant 
when extrapolated to total Brazilian production, indicating 
that approximately 80,000 metric tons of tobacco leaves 
were outside a strictly coordinated supply chain. Up to 
that moment, middlemen accounted for an insignificant 
share of the market and never threatened the functioning 
of the integration system. Even in 2005, their market-
share was small, but it was growing, according to the 
interviews, and was enough to create a number of 
disruptions in the system, such as increasing defaults 
and minor breaches of contract.  
The  study  found  that   smaller   firms   in   the  sample 
acquired 72% of their need for tobacco without 
contracts. The strategy pursued by them was clear: they 
focused on recruiting experienced growers already 
integrated with the major players, and as quickly as 
possible buying tobacco leaves either directly or through 
middlemen in the spot market. The three largest 
companies account for the remaining 28% of tobacco 
bought without contract. These figures confirm that the 
existing system no longer represents a model of perfect 
centrally coordinated supply chain based on loyalty. 
Taken together, these trends suggested a certain loss of 
control over the supply chain and an increase in 
transaction costs. 
Data from sampled growers allow computing 
frequencies of different types of selling strategies 
adopted by growers, as illustrated in Table 1 in the 
methodological section of this article. From 381 growers, 
data on 376 selling strategies were available (5 growers 
were excluded because missing data). From these, four 
groups of growers with similar selling strategies were 
identified by using cluster analysis, as showed in Table 5. 
Each group in Table 5 can be described as follows:  
Group 1 is composed of 78% of sampled growers, 
which account for 76% of the total amount of tobacco 
sold by all growers in the sample. In this group, growers 
have, on average, 96% of sales to a single processor, 
with contract; 1% to a second processor, with contract; 
and 2% to middlemen or other processors, without 
contract. This group of  growers  would  be  closer  to  the 









Total 1 2 3 4 
% S.D. (%) % S.D. (%) % S.D. (%) % S.D. (%) 
Processor 1 (with contract) 96 7 3 5 53 18 52 16 - 
Processor 2 (with contract) 1 4 1 2 37 13 1 5 - 
Spot 1 (no contract) 2 5 96 6 2 5 41 15 - 
Spot 2 (no contract) 0 2 0 0 0 1 6 9 - 
          
Number of growers 293 6 39 38 376 
% of number of growers 78% 2% 10% 10% 100% 





Group 2 consists of only six growers who are 2% of the 
number of sampled growers and who sold 1% of the total 
quantity. It is the smallest group. On average, these 
growers have sold 96% of their production to a 
middlemen or a processor, without a formal contract. 
Therefore, they are entirely outside of the desirable 
loyalty. The low percentage of the number of growers and 
the production of this group in the sample confirms the 
strength and dominance of formal contracts. This is 
evidence that the advantages of the formal contracts 
inhibit the growth of autonomous growers, despite the 
higher profitability of this crop in the face of other 
commercial crops available to family farmers in the 
region. 
Group 3 is mostly composed of non-loyal growers who 
hold contracts with two companies, reallocating a small 
portion of their sales to middlemen and other processors 
without a formal contract. This group comprised 10% of 
the total number of growers in the sample, and accounted 
for 14% of the total quantity sold. On average, the share 
of production sold to one processor is greater than the 
share sold to the other (53% and 37%), suggesting the 
existence of a primary buyer and a secondary buyer, 
though important. This confirms some statements 
obtained from processors’ staff members in the 
interviews, in which a new entrant processor adopts the 
strategy of gradually increasing the amount tobacco 
leaves bought from growers who already hold a contract 
with other processor. 
Group 4 is mainly composed of growers who, on 
average, sell 52% of their production to one processor, 
with contract, and 48% in spot transactions with other 
processors or middlemen. Therefore a large share of 
production is sold in the spot market. This group 
comprised 10% of the number of growers and 9% of total 
production. These figures suggest that a large number of 
growers are ultimately able to divert a share of their 
production under bilateral contracts to other buyers in the 
spot market. 
MEASURING REALLOCATION OF CONTRACTED 
TOBACCO 
 
As stated in the methodological section, the non-loyal 
grower would be perfectly compatible with the main goal 
of loyalty if contracts were fulfilled. In other words, 
growers with more than one contract fulfil all obligations 
by selling exactly what was promised to each processor. 
However, default due to undesirable reallocation of 
contracted tobacco can threaten the system 
competitiveness. In order to measure this kind of 
reallocation the Euclidean distance was used as 
indicator, as presented in the methodological section. 
From processors´ perspective, reallocations should be 
close to zero.  
The Euclidean distance was calculated then normalized 
in order to obtain an indicator ranging from 0 to 100. 
Table 6 presents the averages for this indicator, 
according to the groups established in Table 5. The 
calculated average for the total of 289 sampled growers 
was 9.7, which is a relatively low value, indicating that, 
overall, the reallocation was relatively low. However, the 
calculated standard deviation around this average was 
large, indicating some heterogeneity already established 
among the groups.  
The indicators of Group 1 reallocations presented an 
average of 3.9, which is very low. This group is mostly 
composed of growers who have a formal contract and 
sell a very small share of their production to a second 
buyer in a spot market transaction. As already stated, 
they are the “ideal group” in terms of loyalty. One should 
be aware that this group comprised 82% of growers of 
this sub-sample. 
Group 2 comprises four growers who sold their final 
production to middlemen. The average indicator of 94.5, 
which was close to the maximum of 100, as well as 
inspection of the data, showed that this small group of 
growers reallocated a large share of their contracted 
production to the spot market. 




Table 6. Indicator of production reallocation, average values according to group of growers, 289 
sampled growers. 
 
Groups Average Frequency Standard deviation 
1 3.9 238 7.8 
2 94.5 4 11.0 
3 10.4 18 13.6 
4 45.5 29 14.5 




Group 3 are mostly non-loyal growers who signed 
contracts with two processors, so the indicator should 
show the level of reallocation of production from one 
processor to another. The mean value for the indicator 
was 10.4, thus one can say that the level of reallocation 
is low, although it was higher than the one found in Group 
1, which is composed mostly by loyal growers. From an 
analytical standpoint, the existence of reallocations 
performed by non-loyal growers is even more important 
than the level of current reallocations, as it reveals that a 
relatively large number of growers are learning the new 
game, which offers advantages for them and, therefore, 
has an appeal to newcomers. 
Finally, Group 4 is composed of growers who sell about 
half of their production to a processor with a contract and 
half to middlemen. As in Group 2, reallocation is a 
possibility which has to be evaluated. This group 
comprises 10% of the number of growers of this sub-
sample. The average value of the indicator of reallocation 
was 45.5, which is quite high. As middlemen resell to 
other processors, this high level of reallocation 
establishes a planning problem for processors whose 
contracts are not fulfilled.   
As seen before, contract farming is useful for 
processors, since commitments on quantity and quality of 
tobacco leaf are established. All clauses are important, 
including those related to environmental protection and 
child labour. However, for processors, contractual 
breaches related to undesirable reallocation of the 
growers’ production and default of advance payments are 
the most uncontrollable and economically harmful. The 
gravity is twofold: on one hand, because the processor 
needs the specified tobacco leaf to accomplish its own 
selling contracts, on the other hand because the effect it 
can have on other ex-post transaction costs, such as 
costs of lengthy litigation. According to non-structured 
interviews with members of the processors’ staff, the 
default level was growing, and for some processors it 
reached almost 20% in the 2005 crop season. 
In contract farming, processors bear costs, such as 
those related to technical assistance, credit collaterals 
and distribution of agricultural inputs. In cases of 
undesirable reallocation and payment default, the 
punishment would be litigation and exclusion of the 
grower from its list of suppliers. However, this  is  not  the 
usually observed practice. Litigation is the last approach 
to the problem. First, judges are reluctant to establish 
sentences which aggravate social problems of small 
farmers. Second, with the growing demand and fierce 
competition for suppliers, processors would benefit from 
singing a new contract with the grower for the next crop 
season. Processors are motivated to renegotiate debts, 
which would be paid in the following crop season. This 
solution avoids reduction in the number of suppliers and 
has the potential to increase the amount of tobacco leaf 
contracted in the following year. The general rule is that 
"debt is paid with tobacco leaf, and growers are only able 
to pay if they receive the support of the processor." In this 
case, processors double the bet, as well as the risk. 
According to interviews with processors’ staff members, 
the results of this approach have been positive. 
Processors end up recovering the credits over the years. 
From an accounting perspective, a restructured debt is 
not as damaging to profitability indicators as a debt under 
litigation, and this is another reason to facilitate the 
renegotiation of debt, even with increased risk. The 




Final remarks  
 
This article showed that an efficient hybrid governance 
structure was created for transactions between tobacco 
growers and tobacco processors. This governance 
structures was able to reduce the problem of 
opportunism, taking into account three factors mentioned 
by Ménard (2004). First, processors carefully selected 
growers based on screening and reputation, so that 
loyalty could succeed. Second, they took into 
consideration the necessary balance between 
independence of agents and the need to take common 
actions such as adoption of rigid quality controls, 
guarantee of purchase, crop insurance and information 
channels between processors and growers organizations. 
In this sense, the adopted governance structure included 
neither rigid firm’s hierarchical controls nor fragile spot 
market controls as proposed by Mernard (2004). Third, 
company advisers and AFUBRA were able to reduce 





However, the data and the indicators presented in this 
paper show how an efficient governance of transactions 
can be threatened by competition among buyers. The 
article brings empirical evidence on how sector 
competitiveness can be threatened by competition for 
suppliers. In particular, it shows how transactions based 
on loyalty can be changed, bringing deleterious 
consequences for sector competitiveness. There are 
lessons for business managers and for anti-trust 
authorities. Buyers and suppliers should be aware of the 
deleterious consequences for sector competitiveness 
when they design and introduce new forms of 
transactions. 
The number of transactions in the spot market has 
increased as a result of changes in buyers´ procurement 
strategies. This change introduced uncertainty and higher 
costs for processors. The system was moving towards a 
new shape, with unknown consequences to its own 
competitiveness. These are exactly the undesirable 
conditions that efficient governance of transactions tries 
to overcome. Sector competitiveness could be 
jeopardized by the processors’ competitive strategies; 
assuming that non-written loyalty in bi-lateral contracts 
was one of the main determinants of its competitiveness.  
In fact, the co-existence of spot market and contractual 
forms revealed the adoption of plural forms of 
governance, as proposed by Bradach and Eccles (1989). 
Zylbersztajn and Nogueira (2002) proposed that 
alternative types of governance could coexist as points of 
disequilibrium and plural forms could represent a 
situation of adjustment between the current and future 
forms. They also stressed the effects of changes of the 
institutional environment in generating multiple 
alignments. This article is an empirical confirmation of 
adoption of plural forms due to the occurrence of 
changes in the institutional environment. However, there 
is no evidence that a new equilibrium would be reached 
with a new and more efficient form of governance.  
The article showed how to measure the loss of loyalty. 
Based on the Euclidean distance, an original method to 
measure the level of loyalty is provided. Additionally, it 
raises an important question. How to sustain efficient 
forms of transactions in an environment of tough 
competition for suppliers? If one considers hybrid 
governances, such as contract farming and unwritten 
loyalty, is efficient for a certain industry, taking 
Williamson’s (1996) terms, tough competition should be 
avoided. After all, loss of competitiveness is harmful not 
only for processors but also for suppliers. Solutions, such 
as agreements, are not easy. For instance, cooperative 
strategies are not easy to build up in an environment of 
tough competition; and anti-trust regulations must be 
considered. Solutions for this problem are beyond the 
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